With the advent of cloud computing, individuals and companies alike are looking for opportunities to leverage cloud resources not only for storage but also for computation. Nevertheless, the reliance on the cloud to perform computation raises the unavoidable challenge of how to assure the correctness of the delegated computation. In this regard, we introduce two cryptographic protocols for publicly verifiable computation that allow a lightweight client to securely outsource to a cloud server the evaluation of highdegree univariate polynomials and the multiplication of large matrices. Similarly to existing work, our protocols follow the amortized verifiable computation approach. Furthermore, by exploiting the mathematical properties of polynomials and matrices, they are more efficient and give way to public delegatability. Finally, besides their efficiency, our protocols are provably secure under wellstudied assumptions.
INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is increasingly becoming an attractive option for SMEs interested in minimizing their expenditures by outsourcing their data and computations. However, the lack of security still deters the wide adoption of cloud technology. As a matter of fact, cloud clients lose control over their data once outsourced, and as such they can neither thwart nor detect cloud servers' misbehavior.
Recently, researchers [6, 11, 13, 17, 19] introduced solutions for verifiable outsourced computation whereby a client delegates the execution of computationally demanding operations to the cloud, and further receives the result with some cryptographic proofs asserting the correct execution of requested operations. By definition, these cryptographic proofs fulfill the classical security requirements of correctness and soundness: They neither yield a situation in which a server is falsely accused of misbehavior, nor make the client accept an incorrect result.
In addition to the previously mentioned security requirements, another key prerequisite that should be taken into account when designing solutions for verifiable computation is the efficiency of the proof verification at the client: For a solution to be viable, the computational and the storage complexity of the verification process Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.
ASIA CCS '16 should naturally be lower than the complexity of the outsourced function. This requirement thus seeks solutions that minimize the computational and the storage load at lightweight clients, in the aim of not offsetting the advantages of cloud computing.
In order to be able to check the proof of correct computation efficiently, the client generates a verification key: While some solutions [6, 13] keep this verification key secret, in which case only the client verifies the correctness of the outsourced computation, other proposals [11, [17] [18] [19] allow public verifiability which empowers any third party to verify the validity of the outsourced computation.
Besides public verifiability, several schemes achieve public delegatability [17] [18] [19] . As the name implies, public delegatability enables any third party to submit computation queries to the outsourced function and verify the returned results. Such a property comes in handy in scenarios where an organization outsources the computation of a function to a cloud server, and still wants its employees to delegate the evaluation of that function without exchanging or sharing any secret keys.
In this paper, we focus on the public verifiability and delegatability of two specific functions, namely, high-degree polynomial evaluation and matrix multiplication. Similarly to existing work, we adopt the amortized model [13] : In this model, the client is required to execute a one-time expensive pre-processing operation that is leveraged later for efficient verifications. Furthermore, we suitably tailor the algebraic properties of polynomials and matrices to devise cryptographic solutions that compare favorably to existing work, as they offer better performances and contrary to [11, 20] enable public delegatability.
Contributions:
‚ We first propose a publicly verifiable polynomial evaluation solution whose efficiency derives from the Euclidean division of the polynomial to be outsourced by some randomly generated small-degree polynomial. The basic idea of our solution is that the outsourced polynomial and the quotient polynomial are used to produce the proof of correct computation, whereas the divisor and the remainder polynomials are used together to verify the correctness of the evaluation. Thanks to the properties of Euclidean division, our proposal ensures public delegatability while enjoying better performances than existing work [17] .
‚ Secondly, we propose a solution for publicly verifiable matrix multiplication that exploits the associative property of multiplication in the ring of matrices. As such our solution outperforms the schemes in [11, 20] while ensuring the additional feature of public delegatability.
‚ Both of our solutions are proved to be correct and sound. Their soundness is proved under the t-strong Diffie Hellman (t-SDH) and co-computational Diffie-Hellman (co-CDH) assumptions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II formally defines publicly verifiable computation and the underlying security model. The proposed publicly verifiable polynomial evaluation and matrix multiplication solutions are described and evaluated in Sections III and IV respectively. Finally, we review the state of the art in section V.
BACKGROUND

Publicly Verifiable Computation
According to [18] , a publicly verifiable computation scheme empowers a client to outsource the evaluation of a function to a potentially malicious server while meeting the requirements of:
‚ public delegatability: Any querier (not necessarily the client)
can submit inputs to evaluate the outsourced function;
‚ public verifiability: Any verifier (not necessarily the client or the querier) can assess the correctness of the server's results.
Thus, Parno et al. [18] formally define publicly verifiable computation schemes by the following algorithms:
It is a randomized algorithm executed by the client. It takes as input the security parameter 1 κ and a description of the function f to be outsourced, and outputs a set of public parameters param that will be used by subsequent algorithms, a public key PK f , and an evaluation key EK f .
ProbGenpx, PK f q Ñ pσx, VKxq Given an input x in the domain D f of the outsourced function f and public key PK f , the querier calls this algorithm to produce an encoding σx of input x and a public verification key VKx.
Computepσx, EK f q Ñ σy On input of the encoding σx and the evaluation key EK f , the server runs this algorithm to compute an encoding σy of f's output y " fpxq.
Verifypσy, VKxq Ñ outy A verifier operates this deterministic algorithm to check the correctness of the result σy supplied by the server on input σx. More precisely, this algorithm first decodes σy which yields a value y, and then uses the public verification key VKx associated with the encoding σx to decide whether y is equal to the expected output fpxq. If so, Verify outputs outy " y meaning that fpxq " y; otherwise it outputs an error outy "K.
Besides the properties of public delegatability and verifiability, a publicly verifiable computation scheme should also ensure the security properties of correctness and soundness.
Correctness
A publicly verifiable computation scheme for a family of functions F is deemed to be correct, if whenever an honest server executes the algorithm Compute to evaluate a function f P F on an input x P D f , this algorithm always yields an encoding σy that will be accepted by algorithm Verify (i.e. Verifypσy, VKxq Ñ fpxq). Definition 1. A publicly verifiable computation scheme for a family of functions F is correct, iff for any function f P F and any input
If ProbGenpx, PK f q Ñ pσx, VKxq and Computepσx, EK f q Ñ σy, then: 
Soundness
A publicly verifiable computation scheme for a family of functions F is said to be sound, if for any f P F and for any x P D f , a server cannot convince a verifier to accept an incorrect result. Notably, a verifiable computation scheme is sound if it assures that the only way a server generates a result σy that will be accepted by a verifier as a valid encoding of the evaluation of some function f P F on an input x, is by correctly computing σy (i.e. σy Ð Computepσx, EK f q).
Similarly to [18] , we capture the adversarial capabilities of an adversary (i.e. malicious server) A against a publicly verifiable computation scheme for a family of functions F through a soundness experiment (cf. Algorithm 1).
In this experiment, adversary A first accesses the output of algo- 
PUBLICLY VERIFIABLE POLYNOMIAL EVALUATION
Protocol Overview
The solution we propose for publicly verifiable evaluation of polynomials draws upon the basic properties of Euclidean division of polynomials. Specifically the fact that for any pair of polynomials A and B ‰ 0 of degree d and 2 respectively, the Euclidean division of A by B yields a unique pair of polynomials Q and R such that: i.) A " QB`R and ii.) the degree of quotient polynomial Q equals d´2, whereas the remainder polynomial R has a degree ď 1. Now a client which would like to outsource the evaluation of a polynomial A of degree d, first defines a polynomial BpXq " X 2`b 0 for a randomly chosen b0, and divides A by B to get the quotient polynomial QpXq " ř d´2 i"0 qiX i and the remainder polynomial RpXq " r1X`r0. Next, the client outsources polynomial A together with quotient polynomial Q to the server and publishes the public key PKA " pg b 0 , g r 1 , g r 0 q. Consequently, whenever a querier wants to evaluate polynomial A at point x, it first computes and advertises the public verification key VKx " pg Bpxq , g Rpxq q, and then transmits x to the server. The latter in turn computes y " Apxq and generates the proof π " Qpxq. Given the server's output py, πq, a verifier checks whether g y " pg Bpxπ g Rpxq . The efficiency of the verification in the solution sketched above stems from the fact that B and R are small-degree polynomials. Indeed, to verify the correctness of a result py, πq provided by the server on an input x, the verifier performs a small and constant number of computations as opposed to carrying out Opdq operations to evaluate polynomial A.
It is clear that the soundness of such a protocol relies on the secrecy of polynomials B and R. However since B is a two-degree polynomial, the secrecy of these two polynomials can be easily compromised by disclosing the quotient polynomial Q. To remedy this shortcoming, the client encodes polynomial Q using an additively homomorphic one-way encoding. Namely, each coefficient qi of polynomial Q is encoded as h q i . In this manner, we allow the server to compute the proof π " h Qpxq of correct execution while ensuring the confidentiality of polynomials B and R.
Finally, we use bilinear pairings to let verifiers assess the correctness of the server's results. Accordingly, we show that our solution is sound under the td{2u-Strong Diffie-Hellman (td{2u-SDH) assumption.
Before describing our protocol in full details, we recall the definitions of bilinear pairings and the SDH assumption.
Bilinear Pairings
Definition 3 (Bilinear Pairing). Let G1, G2 and GT be three cyclic groups of the same finite order p.
A bilinear pairing is a map e: G1ˆG2 Ñ GT , with the following properties:
1. e is bilinear: @ α, β P Zp, g P G1 and h P G2, epg α , h β q " epg, hq αβ ;
2. e is computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute epg, hq for any pg, hq P G1ˆG2;
e is non-degenerate: If g is a generator of G1 and h is a generator of G2, then epg, hq is a generator of GT .
Definition 4 (t-SDH Assumption). Let G1, G2 and GT be three cyclic groups of the same finite prime order p such that there exists a bilinear pairing e : G1ˆG2 Ñ GT .
We say that the t-Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption (t-SDH) holds, if given the tuple
for some randomly chosen α P Fp , the probability to produce a pair pβ, h 1{pβ`αP Fpzt´αuˆG2 is negligible.
Description
We assume here that the client wants to outsource the evaluation of a d-degree polynomial ApXq " ř d i"0 aiX i with coefficients ai P Fp where p is a large prime.
Setupp1
κ , Aq Given security parameter 1 κ and a description of polynomial A, algorithm Setup first selects two cyclic groups G1 and G2 of prime order p that admit a bilinear pairing e : G1ˆG2 Ñ GT . Then it picks a generator g and a generator h of groups G1 and G2 respectively, and defines the set of public parameters as:
param " pp, G1, G2, GT , e, g, hq.
Next, algorithm Setup selects randomly b0 P Fp such that polynomial BpXq " X 2`b 0 does not divide polynomial A and performs the Euclidean division of polynomial A by polynomial B in FprXs. We denote the resulting quotient polynomial by QpXq " ř d´2 i"0 qiX i and the resulting remainder polynomial by RpXq " r1X`r0 1 .
Thereupon, algorithm Setup computes the public key
To compute evaluation key EKA algorithm Setup computes qi " h q i P G2 for all 0 ď i ď d´2, and lets
Algorithm Setup concludes its execution by outputting the tuple pparam, PKA, EKAq.
ProbGenpx, PKAq On input of a point x P Fp and public key PKA " pb0, r1, r0q, algorithm ProbGen first computes
VK px,Rq " r x 1 r0 and then outputs the public encoding σx " x and the public verification key VKx " pVK px,Bq , VK px,Rq q.
Computepσx, EKAq Given σx " x and evaluation key EKA " pA, q0, q1, ..., q d´2 q, algorithm Compute evaluates
generates the proof
and outputs the encoding σy " py, πq.
Verifypσy, VKxq Provided with encoding σy " py, πq and verification key VKx " pVK px,Bq , VK px,Rq q, algorithm Verify checks whether the following equation holds:
If so, then Verify outputs y meaning that Apxq " y; otherwise it outputs K.
Security Analysis
Here we state and prove the main security theorems pertaining to our protocol for publicly verifiable polynomial evaluation.
Theorem 1. The scheme proposed above for publicly verifiable polynomial evaluation is correct.
Proof. If on input σx " x P Fp, the server executes algorithm Compute correctly, then the latter's output will correspond to σy " py, πq " pApxq, h
Qpxq q.
Indeed, we have:
Given that A " QB`R in FprXs and that the order of epg, hq is equal to p, we get: Since VK px,Bq " b0g
we conclude that epg, hq y " epVK px,Bq , πqepg, VK px,Rand that Verify outputs y " Apxq. 
FprXs, adversary B simulates O Setup 's response as follows:
1. It defines the public parameters { param " pp, G1, G2, GT , e, g, hq 2. To compute the evaluation key x EKA " pA, p q0, ..., p q d´2 q, it proceeds as described below:
It computes the public key x PKA " p p b0, p r1, p r0q as following:
If pp r0, p r1q " p1, 1q, then adversary B stops the experiment. 
and if we let pp r0, p r1q " ph r 0 , h r 1 q, then we can easily verify that:
‚ a1 " αq1`r1 mod p and a0 " αq0`r0 mod p;
This entails that the polynomials defined as QpXq " ř d´2 i"0 qiX i , BpXq " X 2`α and RpXq " r1X`r0 verify the following equality: A " BQ`R with R ‰ 0.
Therefore we can safely conclude (i) that polynomial B does not divide polynomial A; (ii) that each p qi correctly encodes the i th coefficient of the quotient polynomial Q that results from the Euclidean division of polynomial A by polynomial B; (iii) that the pair pp r0, p r1q correctly encodes the corresponding remainder polynomial R. Indeed, since the pair py, πq passes the verification, it satisfies Equation 1, namely:
, πqepg, p r0p r
Furthermore, by construction:
Algorithm
Since y ‰ Apxq, the above equation implies:
Hence if adversary B does not stop the experiment, then it will be able to break the td{2u-SDH assumption.
Now if adversary B aborts the experiment which occurs when pp r0, p r1q " p1, 1q, then adversary B can conclude that B divides
A. This means that by using a factorization algorithm in FprXs on polynomial A, adversary B will be able to find α, and therewith, break the td{2u-SDH assumption.
Thus, we deduce that if there is an adversary A that breaks the soundness of our protocol for publicly verifiable polynomial evaluation with a non-negligible advantage ǫ, then there is an adversary B that breaks the td{2u-SDH assumption with a non-negligible advantage ě ǫ.
Remark 1. Notice that if
BpXq " X δ`b 0, then using a similar argument as the one above, we can easily show that our protocol for verifiable polynomial evaluation is secure under the t-SDH assumption for t ě td{δu.
Performance Analysis
The reader may refer to Table 1 for a summary of the performances of our protocol for publicly verifiable polynomial evaluation.
Algorithm Setup first generates a random coefficient b0 P Fp to construct polynomial B and conducts an Euclidean division of polynomial A by polynomial B. The latter operation consists of d multiplications and additions, where d is the degree of polynomial A. Once the Euclidean division is performed, algorithm Setup performs one exponentiation in G1 to derive b0, and d`1 exponentiations in G2 to compute r0, r1 and qi. Although computationally expensive, algorithm Setup is executed only once by the client. Besides, its computational cost is amortized over the large number of verifications that third-party verifiers can carry out.
On the other hand, algorithm ProbGen computes the verification key VKx " pVK px,Bq , VK px,Rwhich demands a constant number of operations that does not depend on the degree of polynomial A. More precisely, ProbGen's work consists of computing x 2 in Fp, performing one exponentiation and one multiplication in G1 to get VK px,Bq " g Bpxq , and running one exponentiation and one multiplication in G2 to obtain VK px,Rq " h Rpxq . Furthermore, algorithm Compute runs in two steps: (i) the evaluation of polynomial A at point x which requires at most d additions and multiplications in Fp if the server uses Horner's rule; and (ii) the generation of the proof π which involves d´3 multiplications in Fp and d´1 exponentiations and d´2 multiplications in G2.
Finally, the work at third-party verifiers only consists of one exponentiation and one division in G2 and the computation of 2 bilinear pairings.
With respect to storage, the client is required to store and publish the public key pb0, r1, r0q P G1ˆG 2 2 . The server however keeps the d`1 coefficients ai P Fp of polynomial A and the d´1 encodings qi P G2.
PUBLICLY VERIFIABLE MATRIX MUL-TIPLICATION
Protocol Overview
The protocol we introduce in this section relies on the intuition already expressed in [11] , which states that in order to verify that a server correctly multiplies an pn, mq-matrix M of elements Mij with some column vector x " px1, x2, ..., xmq ⊺ , it suffices that the client randomly picks a secret pn, mq-matrix R of elements Rij , and supplies a server with pn, mq-matrix M and an auxiliary pn, mq-matrix N such that Nij "g M ij g R ij (whereg " g δ for some randomly generated δ). Consequently, when a client prompts the server to multiply matrix M with vector x, the latter returns vector y " py1, y2, ..., ynq ⊺ and proof π " pπ1, π2, ..., πnq ⊺ , such that πi "g y i g ř m j"1 R ij x j if the server is honest. If we denote πi " g γ i and γ " pγ1, γ2, ..., γnq ⊺ , then loosely speaking, the verification process consists of checking whether γ " δ y`R x. Now to transform this intuition into a viable solution, one must ensure that the verification process is much less computationally demanding than the matrix multiplication M x for all vectors x. In [11] , the authors speed up the verification process by generating the secret matrix R using dedicated algebraic PRFs that optimize the multiplication R x. Although this solution gives way to an efficient verification process that takes Opn`mq time, it does not enable public delegatability: Only the client can submit multiplication queries to the server.
We tackle this issue by observing that for any vector λ " pλ1, λ2, ..., λnq, the verification of whether λ γ " δ λ y` λpR xq takes Opnq time if the vector λR is computed beforehand. Therefore, we define the public key by an exponent encoding of λR, and the verification key for vector x by an exponent encoding of p λRq x.
More concretely, we generate the elements in the auxiliary matrix N as Nij "g
for gi " g λ i , we let the public key PKM be a vector of m components PKj " ep ś n i"1 g
, hq, and we compute the verification key for vector x as VKx " ś m j"1 PK x j j . Therefore, the problem generation combined with the verification take Opn`mq time as opposed to performing Opnmq operations to compute the matrix multiplication y " M x.
As a result, the proposed solution does not only offer public delegatability, but also is sound under the assumption of co-computational Diffie-Hellman (co-CDH).
Definition 5 (co-CDH Assumption). Let G1, G2 and GT be three cyclic groups of the same finite prime order p such that there exists a bilinear pairing e : G1ˆG2 Ñ GT .
We say that the co-computational Diffie-Hellman assumption (co-CDH) holds in G1, if given g, g α P G1 and h, h β P G2 for random α, β P Fp , the probability to compute g αβ is negligible.
Protocol for Verifiable Matrix Multiplication
Without loss of generality, we assume that a client outsources to a server the multiplication operations involving an pn, mq-matrix M of elements Mij P Fp (1 ď i ď n and 1 ď j ď m) with p being a large prime.
Setupp1
κ , M q Given security parameter 1 κ and matrix M , algorithm Setup chooses two cyclic groups G1 and G2 of prime order p that admit a bilinear pairing e : G1ˆG2 Ñ GT . It then selects a generator h of group G2 and computesh " h δ for a randomly selected δ in Fp . Thereafter, it randomly picks n generators 2 gi of G1, for all 1 ď i ď n. Subsequently, algorithm Setup defines the public parameters associated with matrix M as:
param " pp, G1, G2, GT , e, tgiu1ďiďn, h,hq.
Afterwards, algorithm Setup computes the evaluation key EKM as follows:
‚ It selects an pn, mq-random matrix R of elements Rij in Fp .
‚ It derives another pn, mq-matrix N of elements Nij " g
‚ Finally, it sets the evaluation key to EKM " pM, Nq.
Next, algorithm Setup determines public key PKM as depicted hereafter:
, hq, 1 ď j ď m.
‚ Then, it lets PKM " pPK1, PK2, ..., PKmq.
At the end of its execution, algorithm Setup outputs public parameters param, public key PKM and evaluation key EKM .
ProbGenp x, PKM q On input of a column vector x " px1, x2..., xmq Computepσx, EKM q Provided with encoding σx " x " px1, x2, ..., xmq ⊺ and evaluation key EKM " pM, Nq, algorithm Compute multiplies matrix M with vector x which yields a column vector y " py1, y2, ..., ynq ⊺ , evaluates the product:
and outputs the encoding σy " p y, Πq.
Verifypσy, VKxq Given σy " p y, Πq and verification key VKx, algorithm Verify checks whether the following equality holds:
If so, algorithm Verify outputs y meaning that M x " y; otherwise it outputs K.
Security Analysis
In this section, we formally prove the security properties of our solution for publicly verifiable matrix multiplication.
Theorem 3. The solution described above for publicly verifiable matrix multiplication is correct.
Proof. If when queried with vector x " px1, x2, ..., xnq ⊺ , the server correctly operates algorithm Compute, then Equation 4 always holds.
Actually in that case, σy corresponds to the pair p y, Πq such that y " py1, y2, ..., ynq ⊺ " M x and Π " ś n i"1
ij . This implies that for all 1 ď i ď n: yi " ř m j"1 Mij xj mod p, and as the order of gi is p, it also implies that:
Therefore, we have:
, hq
where
we get:
and we conclude that Verify outputs y " M x.
Theorem 4. The solution described above for publicly verifiable matrix multiplication is sound under the co-CDH assumption in G1.
Proof. Assume there is an adversary A that breaks the soundness of our protocol for publicly verifiable delegation of matrix multiplication with a non-negligible advantage ǫ. We show in what follows how an adversary B can use adversary A to break the co-CDH assumption in G1 with a non-negligible advantage ǫ 1 » ǫ.
To break the co-CDH assumption, adversary B first calls oracle O co´cdh which in turn outputs the pair pg, g α q P G 1. It lets p g " g α and p h " ph β q δ , computes for all 1 ď i ď n, p gi " p g λ i for some randomly chosen λi P Fp , and sets the public parameters to { param " pp, G1, G2, GT , e, tp giu1ďiďn, h, p hq.
2.
It generates an pn, mq-random matrix p N of elements p Nij P G1; 3. It computes for all 1 ď j ď m,
4. It defines the public key associated with matrix M as x PKM " p x PK1, ..., x PKmq;
5. Finally, it sets the corresponding evaluation key to x EKM " pM, p Nq.
Adversary B concludes its simulation of the oracle O Setup by outputting public parameters { param, public key x PKM and evaluation key x EKM . Note here that the simulated output of oracle O Setup in the game is statistically indistinguishable from the distribution of the output of algorithm Setup in the soundness experiment. Namely, the following is true:
‚ The statistical distribution of matrix p N is identical to the distribution of matrix N generated by algorithm Setup.
‚ For all vectors x " px1, ..., xmq ⊺ P F m p and y " py1, ..., ynq ⊺ " M x, the simulated public key x PKM " p x PK1, ..., x PKmq verifies this equation:
Therefore, we conclude that the distribution of matrix p N and public key x PKM is the same as the distribution of matrix N and PKM " pPK1, ..., PKmq produced by algorithm Setup.
At the end of the experiment, adversary A picks a challenge vector x " px1, x2, ..., xmq ⊺ and queries oracle O ProbGen with the pair p x, x PKM q.
As a result, adversary B simulates oracle O ProbGen and outputs
Afterwards, adversary A returns a response σy " p y, Πq such that y ‰ M x.
In the remainder of this proof, we denote y˚" py1 , y2 , ..., yn q ⊺ " M x.
To break the co-CDH assumption in G1, adversary B first fetches the vector λ " pλ1, λ2, ..., λnq used to compute the powers p gi " p g λ i and verifies whether λ y " λ y˚mod p. If so, adversary B aborts the game; otherwise it breaks co-CDH by returning:
.
Indeed, if σy " p y, Πq passes the verification, then this implies that the following equation holds:
Also given Equation 5, we have:
By dividing Equation 6 with Equation 7, we obtain:
, h¸" e´g α λp y´ y˚q , h βδ"
Therefore if λp y´ y˚q ‰ 0 mod p, then δ λp y´ y˚q ‰ 0 mod p (δ P Fp ) and we can compute:
Hence, adversary B breaks the co-CDH assumption in G1 as long Table 2 : Computation and storage requirements of our protocol for publicly verifiable matrix multiplication as λ y ‰ λ y˚mod p. Fortunately, under the hardness of discrete logarithm, the probability that adversary B finds y such that λ y " λ y˚mod p is negligible. Proof Sketch. Assume there is an adversary A that outputs a vector y " py1, y2, ..., ynq ⊺ verifying the property above with a nonnegligible advantage ǫ. Here we show that there is another adversary B which uses adversary A to break the discrete logarithm assumption in G1 with a non-negligible advantage ě ǫ{n.
Assume that adversary B receives q g P G1 and is required to output λ P Fp such that q g " g λ .
To this effect, adversary B simulates the soundness experiment as depicted in Algorithm 1. More precisely, upon receipt of an pn, mq-matrix M , it simulates the output of O Setup exactly as the soundness experiment except for the following:
‚ It selects k randomly in t1, 2, ..., nu and lets q g k " q g;
‚ for all 1 ď i ď n, i ‰ k, it randomly selects λi P Fp and sets q gi " q g λ i ;
‚ it sets the public parameters to param " pp, G1, G2, GT , e, tq giu1ďiďn, h,hq.
Adversary A eventually returns a pair of vectors x " px1, x2, ..., xmq ⊺ and y " py1, y2, ..., ynq ⊺ that verify y ‰ M x and λ y " λM x mod p, whereby λ " pλ1, ..., λ k´1 , λ, λ k`1 , ..., λnq.
If we denote y˚" py1 , y2 , ..., yn q ⊺ " M x, then the above equality entails that λ " ř n i"1,i‰k λipyi´yiq y k´yk as long as y k ‰ yk . Since y ‰ y˚, then there is at least one index 1 ď j ď n such that yj ‰ yj . Since k is randomly chosen from t1, ..., nu, the probability that y k ‰ yk is at least 1{n, and consequently, adversary B will be able to break the discrete logarithm assumption with advantage ě ǫ{n.
To summarize, if there is an adversary A that breaks the soundness of our protocol for publicly verifiable matrix multiplication with a non-negligible advantage ǫ, then there exists an adversary B that breaks the co-CDH assumption in G1 with a non-negligible advantage ǫ 1 » ǫ.
Performance Analysis
Algorithm Setup generates the pn, mq-random matrix R which requires the generation of nm random numbers in Fp. To compute the elements Nij of matrix N as g δM ij`Rij i , algorithm Setup performs nm multiplications and nm additions in Fp, and nm exponentiations in G1. Furthermore, the generation of public key PKM demands mpn´1q multiplications in G1, nm exponentiations in G1 and m pairings. It should be noted that while algorithm Setup involves expensive operations such as exponentiations and pairings, it is executed only once by the client, and consequently, its cost is amortized over the large number of verifications that a verifier can perform.
To multiply a vector x " px1, x2, ..., xmq ⊺ with matrix M , algorithm ProbGen computes VKx " ś m j"1 PK x j j . This involves m´1 multiplications and m exponentiations in GT .
Moreover, algorithm Compute consists of two operations: (i) the matrix multiplication y " M x which requires nm multiplications and additions in Fp; and (ii) the generation of the proof Π which involves nm exponentiations and pn´1qpm´1q multiplications in G1.
Finally, algorithm Verify evaluates two bilinear pairings, pn´1q multiplications and n exponentiations in G1, and one multiplication in GT .
As for storage, the server is required to keep the pn, mq-matrix M of elements Mij P Fp and the pn, mq-matrix N of elements Nij P G1. On the other hand, the client is required to store and publish the public parameters which are of size Opnq and the public key PKM whose size is Opmq. We highlight the fact that the public parameters' size can be made constant: Instead of advertising the set tgiu1ďiďn, the client can select a hash function H : Fp Ñ G1zt1u and compute the generators gi as Hpiq, for all 1 ď i ď n. On the downside, this optimization makes our scheme secure only in the random oracle model. Table 2 summarizes the performance analysis of our scheme for publicly verifiable matrix multiplication.
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Verifiable Polynomial Evaluation. Benabbas et al. [6] were the first to use algebraic PRFs for the problem of verifiable polynomial evaluation. Their solution only works in the symmetric-key setting, thus does not enable public verifiability as the schemes presented in this paper. In the same line of work, Fiore and Gennaro [11] devise new algebraic PRFs, also used by Zhang and Safavi-Naini [20] , to develop publicly verifiable solutions. Compared to these two solutions, our protocol induces the same amount of computational costs but with the additional property of public delegatability. Another solution for public verification considers signatures for [11] 2pd`1q n pairings nm exp in G1 n pairings co-CDH No [11] 2pn`mq exp in G1 n exp in GT DLin Zhang and Blanton [17] , and uses polynomial commitments [16] to construct these signatures. Besides public verifiability, this solution implements public delegatability. However, the construction by [17] relies on the d-SBDH assumption, whereas our solution is secure under a weaker assumption that is the td{2u-SDH. It is worth mentioning that our protocol can be changed to rely on the td{δu-SDH assumption, where δ is the degree of the divisor polynomial, as specified in Remark 1 of Section 3.3, and therefore our scheme can accommodate higher-degree polynomials. Table  3 3 compares the computational costs our solution for polynomial evaluation with the work described by Fiore and Gennaro [11] and Papamanthou et al. [17] .
Verifiable Matrix Multiplication. Fiore and Gennaro [11] and Zhang and Safavi-Naini [20] exploit algebraic PRFs for publicly verifiable matrix multiplications. However, only the client which outsourced the matrix can submit input vectors to the outsourced multiplication, hence their constructions do not meet the public delegatability requirement. Zhang and Blanton [21] present a construction for publicly delegatable and verifiable outsourcing of matrix multiplication that uses mathematical properties of matrices instead of algebraic PRFs. Unlike our work, the public verifiable scheme suggested in [21] does not transfer the matrix M to the server during Setup (whose purpose is reduced to generating the public parameters). Instead, the problem generation phase prepares the matrix and the input vector for the delegation. This construction is secure under the multiple decisional Diffie Hellman (M-DDH) and the eXternal Diffie-Hellman (XDH) assumptions, which are stronger than the co-CDH assumption we rely on in our solution. Table  3 4 depicts a comparison of our proposal for matrix multiplication with the solution proposed by Fiore and Gennaro [11] and Zhang and Blanton [21] .
Arbitrary functions. A significant collection of work applies succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (SNARKs) to the problem of verifiable computation of arbitrary functions [4, 5, 7, 19] . One of the most relevant applications of the SNARK approach [7] appears in Pinocchio [19] . Pinocchio translates the outsourced function into an arithmetic circuit, which is then converted into a Quadratic Arithmetic Program [14] . As such, it enables public delegatability and public verifiability. However, the security of Pinocchio and other SNARK-based protocols relies on non-falsifiable assumptions as proved by Gentry and Wichs [15] , whereas the security of our schemes only relies on falsifiable assumptions.
Parno et al. [18] propose a solution for public delegation and verification of computation using Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE). However, this scheme is limited to the computation of Boolean functions that output a single bit. For functions with more than one output bit, the client has to repeatedly (for each output bit) launch several instances of the protocol. Alderman et al. [1, 2] also propose an ABE-based protocol for Boolean functions. The authors adopt a scenario orthogonal to ours, in which queriers are identified according to access control policies. Furthermore, Alderman et al. [1, 2] introduce the concept of blind verifiability. In a nutshell, their protocols distinguish queriers from verifiers: The latter may only be authorized to verify an outsourced computation but not to learn its results. In the present paper, the blind verifiability property is out of scope.
Homomorphic MACs and signatures. Another type of solutions use homomorphic MACs [3, 9, 12] or homomorphic signatures [8, 10] . These solutions generally induce a verification as costly as the computation of the outsourced function itself. Homomorphic MACs proposed by Backes et al. [3] take advantage of algebraic PRFs to allow efficient verification, provided that the data is indexed. This solution however is suitable for quadratic functions only. Similarly, Catalano et al. [10] propose homomorphic signatures for polynomial functions with efficient verification and suggest that they can be used for a publicly verifiable computation scheme. Nevertheless, their construction uses expensive multilinear pairings.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced two protocols for publicly verifi-able delegation of computation which enable a client to securely outsource the evaluation of arbitrary degree univariate polynomials and the multiplication of large matrices. We built our protocols upon the algebraic properties of polynomials and matrices. This paved the way for practical solutions that are provably secure against adaptive adversaries under the co-CDH and the SDH assumptions.
